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The study of animal behaviour 
has revealed many intricate 
ways in which individuals deal 
adaptively with their world, some 
of which raise controversial 
issues of interpretation. Scrub 
jays, for instance, adjust their 
food-hiding according to the likely
competition from other jays. If a 
competitor has seen them cache 
food, and they have themselves 
had the experience of  
pilfering others’ caches, they  
re-cache in private [1]. If privacy 
is denied them, they prefer to 
cache behind barriers, and if there
are none they choose ill-lit spots 
furthest from the competitor [2]. 
Denied all these options, they fall 
back on a strategy of confusion, 
multiply re-caching their foods. 
These behaviours make good 
sense, and are easily described in 
mental- state terms: the jay knows 
from its own experience how 
easily a cache can be pilfered 
by a bird that has seen it made, 
so tries to keep its competitors 
ignorant of its own cache sites. 
In doing so, it takes account of 
a particular competitor’s 
viewpoint and clarity of vision, 
and — remembering what it a 
particular competitor is likely to 
have seen — aims to devalue 
that knowledge by re-caching 
somewhere they can’t see, or 
at least confusing the issue by 
re- caching many times. 
In psychology, the ability to 
model the knowledge and beliefs 
of others, as distinct from one’s 
own, is called ‘theory of mind’ [3]. 
Theory of mind develops slowly 
in children and may be impaired 
in autism [4]. Because theory of 
mind is fundamental to linguistic 
communication, the attainment 
has often been thought a crucial 
step in recent human evolution; 
but if a bird possesses the 
same capacity, then our ideas 
about its evolution will need 
Primer revising. It is possible, however, to interpret the bird’s behaviour 
quite differently: that it is the 
consequence of a complex web 
of associations, each association 
acquired according to principles 
well- understood from laboratory 
study of learning in the white 
rat. This sort of explanation 
is sometimes described as 
conditioning; ‘behaviourism’ is 
the philosophy that all learning is 
fundamentally of this associative 
nature, even in cases where we 
experience accompanying mental 
images and thoughts that seem to 
suggest otherwise. 
To make associative 
explanations work for such 
elaborate behaviour patterns, 
one must take quite a bit on 
trust. Learning would have to 
be rapid compared to that of 
the average laboratory rat, and 
sharply focused on just those 
specific features that cure the 
variables important in explaining 
how a particular behaviour 
was learnt. When extended 
to behaviour of the kind that 
suggests understanding, in 
natural environments crowded 
with distracting features that 
may all be salient for survival in 
other ways, associative learning 
accounts can sometimes appear 
unduly trusting. The attraction, to 
animal learning theorists, is the 
chance to de-mystify. Association 
learning avoids postulating 
mental states — there is no 
talk of understanding another’s 
viewpoint, remembering what it 
saw, and so on — so explanation 
is grounded in simple phenomena, 
such as associating two events 
that often occur together in 
time and space or repeating 
behaviour that has previously led 
to reward. Learning theorists have 
shown considerable ingenuity in 
devising associative accounts 
of apparently impressive, even 
intellectual, feats of animal 
behaviour [5,6]. Moreover, the 
fact that the nervous system 
undoubtedly does involve 
synaptic connections of variable 
relative strengths forming 
a complex web of linkages 
has encouraged the idea that 
associative learning is the 
only right and proper way to 
understand animal behaviour [7].
 
 Unfortunately, associative 
accounts can only be tested 
experimentally in tightly 
constrained and simplified cases: 
extension to the complexity of 
the natural worlds of animals, 
even that of a jay’s food-caching 
in the laboratory, tends to be a 
matter of post hoc explanation, 
as in historical sciences, rather 
than being usefully predictive. 
Of course, psychologists who 
study associative learning 
do experimentally test the 
predictions made by their 
theories: but the prediction 
and testing is local to the 
confines of highly artificial 
experimental situations. It is a 
matter of conviction, not open 
to verification, when associative 
learning is extended to account 
for the many complex and flexible 
traits observed under natural 
conditions [8]. The problem can 
only get worse as explanation 
moves from the minutiae of 
single experiments and single 
adaptive traits to the mentality 
of the animal as a whole [9]. 
The tempting economy or 
‘parsimony’ of postulating only 
simple theoretical entities needs 
to be balanced against the power 
and scope of explanation over 
the whole range of an animal’s 
abilities: the apparent simplicity 
of association theory can soon 
lead to unmanageable complexity 
in explaining real life.
What is needed is another 
level of explanation, between 
the massive complexity of the 
neural networks of the brain, 
and the simple efficiency of 
adaptive behaviour in the 
world. This is where cognitive 
explanation comes in: cognition 
offers an interlingua between 
brain and behaviour [10]. 
Using the conceptual tools of 
cognitive science — theory of 
mind, working memory, focus of 
attention, cognitive map, number 
concept and counting, procedural 
knowledge, problem-solving, and 
many others — allows theories 
to be developed, simple enough 
to be comprehended and used 
to make testable predictions in 
natural environments, yet tight 
enough to be mapped precisely 
onto observed behaviour. (In 
principle, cognitive explanations 
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R446Figure 1. Co-operative hunting has been described in a wide range of animal species: but are similar psychological processes operat-
ing in each case? 
(A,B) Parties of (usually) male chimpanzees Pan troglodytes hunt monkeys, especially colobines, and share the meat extensively 
with other group members after a kill. Chimpanzee hunting is difficult to observe clearly in their dense, three-dimensional rainforest 
habitat, but has been claimed to involve rich understanding of the process of co-operation [22], with individuals taking mutually in-
terlocking roles, for example ‘driver’, ‘blocker’ and ‘ambusher’, although this remains controversial [23]. (C) Harris’ hawks Parabuteo 
unicinctus also hunt cooperatively [24]. Extended families of hawks pursue and kill mammals, particularly rabbits, and it appears to 
observers that some individuals pursue the prey while others block its escape. (D) Pseudoscorpions are able to kill prey vastly larger 
than themselves by co-operation [25]; in this illustration, Paratemnoides nidificator individuals are attacking the vespid wasp Apoica 
pallens at the Asa Wright Nature Center, Trinidad. Cognitive analyses have not been applied to co-operative hunting in birds or ar-
thropods: the assumption seems to be that chimpanzees may ‘behave cognitively’, whereas other animals can always be explained 
by simpler processes. This categorization is no more likely to be helpful in biology than those other binary divisions, such as innate 
versus learned, or insightful versus automatic, generally seen now as simplistic and misleading. Instead, to make progress it is es-
sential to model the competence of each species in the same terms: and these can only be cognitive. Photo credits: chimpanzees 
(A,B), John Mitani; pseudoscorpions (D), Allan Hook.can also be meshed with brain 
structures, but in animal work 
this is in practice more often a 
hope for the future, waiting for 
developments in imaging that can 
be used under relatively natural 
conditions.) 
An everyday analogy may be 
made with our understanding 
of how a television works. 
There is no doubt that its 
‘behaviour’ — showing moving 
images of things happening at 
other places and times — is fundamentally caused by the 
electronics. However, handing 
us a full circuit diagram would 
seldom be educationally helpful. 
Rather, what is needed is an 
intervening level of explanation, 
in which it can be explained 
that images are sliced up, 
salami-fashion, then relayed 
as a linear signal, travelling 
near- instantaneously along wires 
as electric waves and across 
space as radio waves, finally 
re- assembled by the electronics of the set. Only with the aid of 
this ‘cognitive model’ can one 
start to discuss intelligently 
the origin of that odd flicker or 
annoying stripe on the picture, 
and begin to decide whether it 
relates to characteristics of the 
set, the aerial, or the transmitter. 
The same applies in biology. 
For an animal as simple as the 
sea-slug Aplysia, with under 
20,000 neurons, many of them 
very large, expecting to explain 
behaviour directly by tracing 
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[11]. But for vertebrates, the 
combinatorial explosion of 
possible neural interconnections 
in the vastly larger brain renders 
this an impractical task. Indeed, 
even Aplysia has a wider range of 
behaviour than is understood at 
the neural level, and a cognitive 
approach may yet prove useful for 
this species too. 
In behavioural biology, a 
fundamental goal is to map 
between brain and behaviour, and 
the cognitive level of explanation 
provides an effective tool for 
doing so. However, cognitive 
models can be instantiated in 
material other than flesh and 
blood: indeed, the origins of 
modern cognitive neuroscience 
lie in the development of 
‘intelligent machines’ by Alan 
Turing and others. Just as a 
computer program can be run 
with solid state electronics, or 
with valves and resistors, or 
even hydraulic components, so 
also cognitive models of mental 
function are semi-independent 
of hardware. Relying on this 
freedom, some psychologists 
have extensively used digital 
computers to test their cognitive 
models, as simulations in which 
the blow- by- blow behaviour of 
the machine and the human can 
be compared for match — for 
example, chessplaying, formal 
logic and developmental 
stage-transitions in children’s 
understanding [12,13]. Modern 
psychology relies almost entirely 
on cognitive models of behaviour; 
although few are explicitly tested 
as simulations, clear and testable 
predictions can nevertheless 
be made from these theories, 
because they are expressed at 
the ‘systems level’ of cognition. 
The cognitive level of 
explanation has proved 
versatile for understanding 
human behaviour, and in the 
next few years we can expect 
see this extended throughout 
behavioural biology. Already, it 
is no coincidence that some of 
the most exciting discoveries in 
animal behaviour of recent years 
have begun from a cognitive 
perspective. As one example, 
consider the numerical abilities 
of animals. Chimpanzees, taught the cardinal numbers as Arabic 
numerals, have proved able 
to compute simple sums with 
no explicit training of ordinal 
number; and knowing numbers 
extends their abilities [14]. 
Chimpanzees cannot normally 
succeed in a task in which 
the rule is: whichever of two 
piles of food you point to, your 
companion gets, and you are 
left with the other. Trial after 
trial, a chimpanzee will point 
to the largest pile, only to be 
frustrated by the outcome: they 
simply cannot inhibit their natural 
attraction to the desired goal. But 
if Arabic numbers are substituted, 
they immediately solve the 
problem and switch to the lower 
number; if the test reverts to real 
entities, they again fail. 
 A grey parrot, Alex, has been 
taught various human words to 
facilitate study of its abilities: 
being a parrot, it is able to speak, 
but Alex understands appropriate 
word use rather than merely 
‘parroting’ the words [15]. This 
has enabled precise testing of 
Alex’s understanding of number. 
After learning numbers as labels 
for quantities, he was tested 
with more complicated arrays 
of objects: for instance, several 
blocks and several balls, each 
coming in two different colours. 
He was reliably able to answer 
questions about the size of a 
specific subset, such as ‘How 
many green balls?’, and showed 
that he understood verbal 
information of the same sort [16]. 
This would be an impressive 
ability for a three-year old child, 
and it may be that psittacine 
birds are innately equipped with 
mathematical concepts that the 
child only develops slowly during 
an extended series of interactions 
with adults. 
By questioning whether 
animals possess or can acquire 
concepts like ordinal and cardinal 
number, relative and absolute 
numerosity, set membership 
and overlap, these and other 
fascinating experiments [17] 
have revealed hidden depths to 
how animals count the world. 
No doubt, now that these data 
are known, learning theorists will 
manage to devise associative 
accounts to explain the animals’ abilities. The point is not that 
any particular animal feat will 
‘disprove’ association learning; in 
fact, associative explanations of 
realistically complex phenomena 
are worryingly unfalsifiable. 
Rather, it is quite unclear how 
the topic of number and counting 
could ever have been explored 
from a standpoint of animal 
learning theory; and just the same 
applies to many other current 
topics in animal behaviour, 
including social comprehension, 
spatial knowledge and navigation, 
imitation and teaching, and 
everyday understanding of 
physical systems such as tool 
use or weather. The advantage 
of using a cognitive level of 
description is that it tends to 
lead to interesting experiments, 
novel regimes of observation, 
and theories of naturally adaptive 
behaviour that can be tested and 
refined. 
Why does any of this need 
saying, if the advantages of 
treating animals as cognitive 
systems are so clear? Where’s 
the controversy? We suspect that 
the reluctance of biologists to 
embrace cognitive explanation 
stems from the elision — in 
much of the popular and even 
some scientific writing on animal 
abilities — between cognition, 
intelligence and consciousness. 
The tacit assumption is often 
made that, if behaviour is best 
understood as the result of 
cognitive processes, the animal 
is showing more intelligence 
than if an account in terms of 
association learning will suffice. 
In fact, ascription of more or less 
intelligence to animal species 
is seldom useful, as there is 
no reliable scale of intellectual 
differences [18]. Among humans, 
intelligence measurements are 
expressed statistically in terms 
of a reference population’s 
test scores, calibrated against 
educational achievement. Nothing 
like that exists for animals, and 
our everyday judgements of 
animal ‘smartness’ are usually 
based on how well an animal’s 
social system and communicative 
modality mesh with our own. 
Worse, the use of cognitive 
explanation seems to bring a whiff 
of consciousness along with it. 
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animal welfare, this may be 
manna; while for anyone 
trained in the dry theorems of 
animal learning it is anathema, 
reason enough to strive 
desperately for an associative 
counter- explanation. But neither 
attitude is justified: despite years 
of fascination with the biological 
function and brain localization 
of human consciousness, 
cognitive theory neither needs 
nor explains consciousness 
[19]. Animal consciousness is a 
fascinating area of debate, but 
not one likely to be resolved by 
empirical evidence. Although 
the root meaning of cognition 
is thinking, and to many people 
thinking is a quintessentially 
conscious activity, from a 
cognitive perspective thinking 
is simply a mechanistic, 
computational process 
recognizable by its products: 
thinking enables the thinker 
to ‘go beyond the information 
given’. The cognitive revolution 
in behavioural and brain sciences 
was a direct product of the 
development of computing 
machines by Alan Turing 
and others, and the resulting 
de-mystification of ‘mental’ 
processes. Of course, mental 
states and operations had been 
discussed for millennia (thought, 
intention, and reminiscence are 
not new terms), but from the 
new cognitive perspective all 
mental operations were seen 
as information processing. The 
brain came to be viewed as a 
device that converts information 
from one code to another (e.g. 
from visual to phonological code, 
when we read silently), stores 
and retrieves information (from 
the fleeting traces of immediate 
visual memory to the laborious 
recall of events in one’s distant 
past), and operates upon 
existing information to compute 
new ‘knowledge’ (planning 
future activities and solving 
problems). A cognitive approach 
to animal behaviour aims to 
answer ‘how’ questions [20], 
deriving and testing mechanistic 
theories couched in information 
processing terms rather than 
phenomenology, and thus explore 
the variety of cognitive systems that exist in different species of 
animal. 
Treating animals as cognitive 
systems is therefore not an 
approach that should be 
reserved for the most flexible 
and human- like species, 
while the behaviour of simpler 
animals is safely explained as 
‘merely’ innate or as learned by 
association (Figure 1). Indeed, 
whether an animal’s behaviour is 
cognitive, and thus by implication 
‘clever’, or associatively learnt 
is not an empirical question 
at all. These are simply two 
different ways of studying the 
same behaviour, and in the 
complex natural environments of 
most species only the cognitive 
approach leads to testable 
predictions. 
Why are animals cognitive? 
One answer is that studying 
animal behaviour cognitively 
offers the best chance of 
understanding the evolution 
of our own mind — tracing the 
history of cognition in primate 
evolution. More generally, 
the cognitive approach offers 
the only possibility of dealing 
scientifically with cases of flexible 
and sophisticated behavioural 
abilities in animals, which may 
prove more widespread in nature 
than is sometimes obvious from 
our necessarily anthropocentric 
viewpoint [21]. This is important, 
because charting the range of 
independently evolved, advanced 
cognitive capacities in many 
taxa can provide evidence of the 
biological utility and evolutionary 
origins of cognition. 
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